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  Policies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions are likely to increase energy prices. Higher en-
ergy prices raise farmer costs for diesel and other fuels, irrigation water, farm chemicals, and 
grain drying. Simultaneously, renewable energy options become more attractive to agricultural 
producers. We consider both of these impacts, estimating the economic and environmental 
consequences of higher energy prices on U.S. agriculture. To do this we employ a price-en-
dogenous agricultural sector model and solve that model for a range of carbon-tax–based en-
ergy price changes. Our results show mostly positive impacts on net farm income in the inter-
mediate run. Through market price adjustments, fossil fuel costs are largely passed on to con-
sumers. Additional farm revenue arises from the production of biofuels when carbon taxes 
reach $30 per ton of carbon or more. Positive environmental benefits include not only green-
house gas emission offsets but also reduced levels of nitrogen leaching. 
 




Demand for climate change mitigation and green-
house gas emission reduction policies has in-
creased over the last decade. Such policies if im-
plemented will generally lead to increased prices 
of fossil fuels since in the United States fossil fuel 
use accounts for approximately 84 percent of green-
house gas emissions (U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency 2004). While the pursuit of green-
house gas mitigation may lead to income opportu-
nities for agriculture in the form of sequestration 
and emission management contracts (McCarl and 
Schneider 2000), such opportunities have been 
controversial in international negotiations, and it is 
uncertain how these opportunities will play a role 
when all details have been worked out. Thus, we 
chose to examine the effects of carbon prices on 
energy prices only where agriculture is largely a 
passive party, as discussed in McCarl and Schnei-
der (2000). This assumption was also employed by 
Peters et al. (2001) in their economic analysis of 
U.S. agriculture and the Kyoto Protocol. 
  Higher fuel prices will have consequences for 
many sectors of the economy through increased 
production costs and associated commodity price 
changes. Previous studies have estimated the im-
pacts of carbon-tax–induced increases on energy 
prices in U.S. agricultural production costs and 
farm income. Particularly, some have predicted 
severe negative effects on farm income. For ex-
ample, the study by Francl, Nadler, and Bast 
(1998) addressed the implications of a 25 cents per 
gallon fuel tax using a budgeting-based analysis. 
Therein they found that farmer’s net income would 
fall substantially. Smaller impacts were found by 
Antle et al. (1999), who simulated economic ef-
fects of energy prices on Northern Plains grain 
producers using an econometric model that allowed 
for acreage substitution but held prices constant. 
Two additional studies were undertaken that used 
price-endogenous agricultural sector models. The 
above-mentioned study by Peters et al. (2001) esti-
mated that net cash returns for U.S. crop and live-
stock producers would decline by 0.3, 2.1, and 4.1 
percent at carbon taxes of $14, $100, and $200 per 
ton of carbon equivalents (tce), respectively. Kon-
yar and Howitt (2000) estimate a 2.3 percent in-
crease in farmers’ net revenue at a carbon equiva-
lent price of $348 per ton. In all of the above stud-
ies the effect of fuel prices on the possibilities to 
produce biofuels was neglected. 
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  This study extends the previous work by 
 
▪  integrating biofuel feedstock production pos-
sibilities, 
▪ linking agricultural adjustments to environ-
mental impacts, and 
▪  employing a price-endogenous U.S. agricul-
tural sector model, which differs methodol-
ogically from the tools used in some of the 
previous analyses. 
 
  Methodological differences include (a) the use 
of non-linear constant elasticity demand curves as 
opposed to the assumptions of infinitely elastic 
demand in Francl, Nadler, and Bast (1998) and 
Antle et al. (1999) or linearly decreasing demand 
in Peters et al. (2001) and Konyar and Howitt 
(2000), (b) the historical crop mix approach to 
aggregation (Onal and McCarl 1991) as opposed 
to the positive mathematical programming ap-
proach used by Peters et al. (2001) and Konyar 
and Howitt (2000), (c) simultaneous considera-
tion of feed processing and livestock raising ac-
tivities as opposed to the crop-only studies of 
Antle et al. (1999) and Konyar and Howitt 
(2000), and (d) a detailed international trade rep-
resentation (Chen and McCarl 2000) for major 
agricultural commodities as opposed to all the 
other studies. 
  Given the above-mentioned modifications, we 
will reassess the agricultural sector impacts of 
increased energy prices arising from carbon-
emission–based tax regulations. The tax is as-
sumed to be unilaterally implemented in the 
United States. We will report economic surplus 
changes, price adjustments, agricultural manage-
ment responses, and environmental consequences 
including changes in agricultural carbon sinks, 
non–CO2-related greenhouse gas emissions, ero-
sion, and nutrient runoff. We assume that agri-
culture is only an indirect participant in climate 
change mitigation policies. Thus, we will not in-
clude credits or penalties for changes in soil car-
bon stocks, methane and nitrous oxide emissions, 
and other environmental qualities. 
 
Methodology and Assumptions 
 
To simulate farm sector response to increased 
energy prices, we use the Agricultural Sector and 
Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas (ASMGHG) model. 
This mathematical-programming–based model is 
an extension of earlier versions of the Agricul-
tural Sector Model (ASM) as documented in 
Baumes and McCarl (1978), Chang et al. (1992), 
Schneider (2000), and Schneider and McCarl 
(2002). Crop and livestock production activities 
are endogenous variables in ASMGHG with exo-
genously specified input and output coefficients. 
The complete set of agricultural activities (Table 1) 
covers not only current technologies but also po-
tential options that might become attractive under 
certain policy scenarios. An ASMGHG solution 
yields a simulation of prices, production, con-
sumption, and international trade in 63 U.S. re-
gions for 22 traditional and 3 perennial energy 
crops, 29 animal products, and more than 60 
processed agricultural products. Trade relationships 
are integrated between and within the United 
States and 28 major foreign trading partners (Chen 
and McCarl 2000) for 8 major traded commodities. 
The spatial scope of ASMGHG is summarized in 
Table 2. 
  Environmental impacts (Table 3) are integrated 
by linking ASMGHG to results from biophysical 
simulation models. Region-, crop-, and manage-
ment-specific impacts on soil carbon sequestra-
tion, nitrogen and phosphorus runoff and perco-
lation, and soil erosion are computed using the 
Environmental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC)
1 
(Williams et al. 1989) crop simulator. Afforesta-
tion is incorporated into ASMGHG through a 
forestry response curve (Schneider and McCarl 
2002) generated using the Forest and Agricultural 
Sector Optimization Model (FASOM) (Adams et 
al. 1996; Alig, Adams, and McCarl 1998). 
  The general mathematical structure of ASMGHG 
is documented in Schneider and McCarl (2002). 
Details on the implementation of major green-
house gas mitigation strategies are given in Schnei-
der (2000) and Schneider and McCarl (2003). De-
tails on emission estimates from fossil fuel usage 
are given in the section below. To analyze the 
agricultural impacts of carbon-emission–based 
energy taxes, we compute the increase in farm 
input costs by multiplying the carbon tax with the 
carbon emissions associated with different inputs. 
The carbon tax levels were also translated into a  
 
1  For this study, we used EPIC Version 8120. Details about this 
version are available from the EPIC team or the related web page at 
http://www.brc.tamus.edu/blackland/. 
 Schneider and McCarl  Implications of a Carbon-Based Energy Tax for U.S. Agriculture   267 
 
Table 1. Agricultural Management Alternatives in ASMGHG 
Decision parameter  Available options in ASMGHG 
Crop choice (index c)  Cotton, corn, soybeans, winter wheat, durum wheat, hard red winter wheat, hard red and 
other spring wheat, sorghum, rice, barley, oats, silage, hay, sugar cane, sugar beets, 
potatoes, tomatoes, oranges, grapefruit, switchgrass, willow, hybrid poplar 
Irrigation alternatives
a No irrigation 
Full irrigation 
Tillage system alternatives
a Conventional tillage (< 15% plant cover) 
Reduced tillage (15–30% plant cover) 
Zero tillage (> 30% plant cover) 
Fertilization alternatives
a Observed nitrogen fertilizer rates  
Nitrogen fertilizer reduction corresponding to 15% stress 
Nitrogen fertilizer reduction corresponding to 30% stress 
Animal production choice  Dairy, cow-calf, feedlot beef cattle, heifer calves, steer calves, heifer yearlings, steer 
yearlings, feeder pigs, pig finishing, hog farrowing, sheep, turkeys, broilers, egg layers, 
and horses 
Feed mixing choice  1,158 specific processes based on 329 general processes differentiated by 10 U.S. regions  
Livestock production alternatives  Four different intensities (feedlot beef), two different intensities (hog operations), liquid 
manure treatment option (dairy and hog operations), BST treatment option (dairy) 
a Irrigation, tillage, and fertilization alternatives are contained in index j. 
 
 
price increase in the value of bioenergy feed-
stocks. Subsequently, we solved ASMGHG for a 
wide range of carbon tax levels and assessed 
changes relative to a zero carbon tax baseline. 
 
Farm-Level Cost Changes Under 
Carbon-Based Energy Taxes 
 
Agricultural enterprises use fossil fuels directly or 
indirectly in numerous ways. Machinery opera-
tions, irrigation water pumping, application of 
fertilizers and pesticides, and grain drying con-
sume the bulk of crop-management–related en-
ergy (Hrubovcak and Gill 1997). The change in 
production expenditures in ASMGHG is gener-
ally calculated as 
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where ∆xr,c,s,j represents the per-acre cost change 
differentiated by region (index r), crop (index c), 
land type (index s), and management alternative 
(index j); 
CE
g p  represents the hypothetical carbon 
equivalent price imposed on regulated greenhouse 
gas emission accounts (index g);   repre-
sents the per-acre use of agricultural production 




ff,f,r,c,g represents the net 
requirement of fossil fuel type (index ff) per unit 
of agricultural production factor by region and 
crop; and CEff,r,g  represents the net emissions by 
greenhouse gas account and region from one unit 
of each relevant fossil fuel type. Details on data 
sources and computations of individual terms in 
equation (1) are given below. 
  The first term on the right-hand side of equa-
tion (1) is 
CE
g p —the carbon price or tax. The cur-
rent level is zero, but energy or climate policies 
could lead to positive carbon prices in the future. 
To address the uncertainty of future climate 
change mitigation policies, we solve ASMGHG 
under a wide range of hypothetical carbon prices, 
from $0 to $500 per tce. While prices as high as 
$500 per tce equivalent appear unlikely, they are 
useful to show trends and to gain model insight. 
In addition, the computational cost of additional 
price scenarios beyond the expected price range is 
negligible. 




ff,f,r,c,g are established for major agricul-
tural production factors (index f). These include 
directly used fossil fuels (index ff) and other inputs  
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Table 2. Spatial Scope of ASMGHG 




Canada, East Mexico, West Mexico, Caribbean, Argentina, 
Brazil, Eastern South America, Western South America, 
Scandinavia, European islands, Northern Central Europe, 
Southwest Europe, France, East Mediterranean, East Europe, 
Adriatic, former Soviet Union, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, North 
Africa, West Africa, South Africa, East Africa, Sudan, West 
Asia, China, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Korea, 
South East Asia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia, and Australia 
Excess demand and supply 
function parameter for 8 major 
crop commodities; transportation 
cost data; computation of trade 
equilibrium 
U.S.  United States  Demand function parameters for 
crop, livestock, and processed 
commodities  
Major U.S. regions (10)  Northeast, Lake states, Corn Belt, Northern Plains, Appalachia, 
Southeast, Delta states, Southern Plains, Mountain states, and 
Pacific states 
Feed mixing and other process 
data; labor endowment data 
Minor U.S. regions (63)  Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Northern California, Southern 
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Idaho, Northern Illinois, Southern Illinois, Northern Indiana, 
Southern Indiana, Western Iowa, Central Iowa, Northeastern 
Iowa, Southern Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, 
Northwestern Ohio, Southern Ohio, Northeastern Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas–High Plains, Texas–Rolling 
Plains, Texas–Central Blackland, Texas–East, Texas–Edwards 
Plateau, Texas–Coastal Belt, Texas–South, Texas–Transpecos, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming 
Crop and livestock production 
data and activities; land type and 
water resource data 
Land types (6)  Agricultural land: land with wetness limitation, low erodible land 
(erodibility index [EI] < 8), medium erodible land (8 < EI < 20), 
highly erodible land (EI < 20); pasture; forest  
Land endowments; cost, yield, 
and emission data adjustment 
a The international regional resolution differs across the eight traded crops. For livestock and processed crop commodities, one 
rest-of-the-world region is used. 
 
(f ∉ ff) whose manufacturing processes require 
large amounts of fossil fuel based energy. Direct 
uses in this analysis include fuel for tractors and 
self-propelled machinery, and on-farm energy for 
irrigation and grain drying. Indirect uses of fossil 
fuels refer to off-farm requirements during the 
manufacturing or delivering process of agricul-
tural inputs. In this study, we integrate data for 
off-farm fuel consumption for manufacturing of 
fertilizer and pesticides. Because of data defi-
ciencies, fossil energy embodied in other agri-
cultural inputs, such as farm machinery and hous-
ing, is not included. More details on computation 
of both the   and s
Inp
,,,, frcsj a ff,f,r,c,g coefficients are 
given below for each relevant input category. 
  The final term in equation (1), CEff,g, refers to 
net carbon emissions from directly or indirectly 
used primary fossil fuel based energy sources. 
Numerical values for these coefficients were de-
veloped based on recent reports of the U.S. De-
partment of Energy (2002). In particular, the as-
sumptions for net emissions in ASMGHG amount 
to 2.77 kg CE per gallon of diesel, 2.26 kg CE per 
gallon of gasoline, 14.86 kg CE per thousand 
cubic feet of natural gas, and 10.97 kg CE per 
thousand cubic feet of liquefied petroleum gas. 
Electricity is, for modeling purposes, also re-
garded as a primary energy source. However, the 
net carbon emission coefficients differ across 
U.S. states depending on the average regional fuel 
input composition in electrical power plants. For 
example, one kilowatt hour of electricity causes 
net emissions of 278 g per CE in North Dakota, 
233 g CE in Iowa, 103 g CE in South Carolina,  
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Table 3. Environmental Accounts in ASMGHG 
Account type  Account elements 
Greenhouse gas emission accounts 
affected by energy tax policy 
(index g) 
Carbon emissions from on-farm fossil fuel use for agricultural machinery (fuelc), carbon 
emissions from irrigation (irrgc), carbon emissions from grain drying (drygc), carbon 
emissions from fertilizer manufacture (fertc), carbon emissions from pesticide manufacture 
(pestc), greenhouse gas emission offsets from bioenergy 
Greenhouse gas emission accounts 
not affected by energy tax policy 
Soil carbon changes, carbon sequestration from afforestation, methane emission from rice 
cultivation, nitrous oxide emissions from nitrogen applications, methane emissions from 
ruminant animals, methane emissions from livestock manure, nitrous oxide emissions from 
livestock manure, methane emission savings from livestock manure digestion 
Other environmental accounts not 
affected by energy tax policy 
Soil erosion through wind and water, nitrogen and phosphorus losses from surface runoff, 
subsurface flow, percolation, immobilization, and other processes 
 
 
181 g CE in Texas, and 35 g CE in Oregon, with 
a U.S. average of 166 g CE. 
 
  On-farm fossil fuel use. Fossil fuels, primarily 
diesel, are combusted on-farm to operate tractors 
and agricultural machinery. ASMGHG uses in-
formation from cost and return budgets (Benson 
et al. 1997) to determine the direct fossil fuel use 
requirements for the portrayed regions, crops, 
land types, and management practices. Thus, the 
 coefficients are values directly taken 
from the production surveys. Fossil fuel shares 
are trivial, with s
Inp
,,,, ff r c s j a
ff,f,r,c,g=“fuelc”=1| ff= f and sff,f,r,c,g= 
0|ff≠f. 
 
  Irrigation. Energy used for irrigation includes 
fuel needed to pump ground and surface water 
plus fuel needed to apply the water on the field. 
These emissions vary depending on location and 
irrigation system. In ASMGHG, the irrigation 
intensity 
2 s j =  is specified in feet per 
acre and contained in the cost and return database 
for crop budgets. Total fossil fuel requirements 
for irrigation water 
2 , "irrH O", , , "irrgc" ( ff f r c g ==  are 
determined using information from the cost and 
return crop budgets and special irrigation surveys 
(U.S. Department of Commerce 1994). 
Inp





  Grain drying. To compute the fossil energy 
consumption for post-harvest drying of grains, 
two types of information are established: first, the 
average moisture content to be removed by the 
drying operation, and second, the amount of fossil 
energy needed to remove one point of moisture. 
In turn, moisture points per acre are calculated 
using 
(2)  , 
2 %H O Inp Comm
" d r y i n g " ,,,, ,, ,,, fr c s jr c j r c = =∆ ⋅ am
 
where   represents the average number of 
moisture percentage points removed per unit of 
grain yield, and   represents the per-acre 
grain yield. All coefficients are indexed as shown 






ff,f=“drying”,r,c,g=“drygc” to dry one unit of corn or 
rice by one moisture percentage point are taken 
from Bern (1998), Brees (2003), and Thompson 
(1999). Energy requirements for other grains such 
as wheat, soybeans, and sorghum are assumed to 
equal those for corn, with adjustments made for 
different bushel weights. 
 
  Fertilizers. Fertilization is an energy-intensive 
process involving the use of energy for fertilizer 
manufacturing and fertilizer application. Off-farm 
fuel requirements from manufacturing are com-
puted as the product of the fertilization rate 
,,,, nt r c s j  (nt = nutrient index) times sff,nt,g=“fertc”, 
the indirect fuel use requirement per unit of fer-
tilizer [equation (1)]. The basic fertilizer rates 
 are taken from the cost and return crop 
budgets. The fossil energy requirements to manu-
facture one unit of fertilizer (s
Inp
,,,, nt r c s j a
ff,nt,g=“fertc”) depend 
on the type of manufacturing process chosen. In 
ASMGHG, a weighted average per nutrient is 
used, based on computations by Bhat et al. (1994). 
Note that the sff,nt,g=“fertc” coefficients are not 
indexed over region and crops. Fuel combusted 
during the application of fertilizer is part of the 
on-farm fossil fuel use account described above. 
  Greenhouse gas emissions from fertilizer arise 
not only from the above-described energy use but 




also from other sources. Particularly, fertilizer 
impacts soil carbon sequestration and nitrous ox-
ide emissions through crop growth, residue de-
composition, pH alterations, nitrification, de-nitri-
fication, and air volatilization. These impacts are 
estimated through EPIC simulations and inte-
grated into ASMGHG’s soil carbon and nitrous 
oxide emission accounts. Due to our assumed 
policy design, soil carbon and nitrous oxide emis-
sions are only accounted, not taxed. 
 
  Pesticides. ASMGHG also uses accounts for 
energy associated with pesticide applications. 
Particularly, the manufacturing of pesticides in-
volves energy from a series of chemical reactions 
such as heating, stirring, distilling, filtering, dry-
ing, and similar processes. Pesticides are formu-
lated as active ingredients before finally being 
packed for commercial release. We use four data 
sources to approximate fuel requirements per acre 
associated with the application of pesticides. 
First, each crop production budget contains an 
estimate of the expenditure on herbicides (hc), 
fungicides (fc), and insecticides (ic). Second, a 
database compiled by the USDA National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) gives the 
average amount of pesticide use in terms of active 
ingredients   by state and crop during 
the period 1990 to 2000 (Bennett 2002). Third, 
we employ Bhat et al.’s (1994) estimate of the net 
energy requirement (s
Inp
, ,,, ˆ ( ai pc r c t a
“energy”,ai) for 32 active 
pesticide ingredients (index ai). Fourth, the shares 
of individual energy sources of fossil fuel type f 
(sff,ai,g=“pestc”) embodied in each active ingredient 
are taken from Green (1987). 
  To calculate the fossil fuel intensity of pesti-
cide applications, we develop an estimate of aver-
age per-acre use of active ingredient by crop, re-
gion, and management alternative  ,  
and the amount of each fossil fuel type per unit of 
active ingredient (s
Inp
,,,, ( fa i r c s j = a
ff,ai,g=“pestc”). We assume rela-
tive shares of active ingredients for each crop and 
each region to be constant across all management 
alternatives but allow total amounts to vary. 
Then, we use management-specific data on total 
expenditures on herbicides, fungicides, and in-
secticides to estimate the per-acre use of active 
ingredients for alternative management practices. 
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where xpc,r,c,j is the expenditure on pesticides (in-
dex  pc,{pc}={hc,ic,fc}),  ,, pc r c x   the crop area 
weighted average expenditure over all manage-
ment practices [see equation (4)], and 
Inp
,, , ˆ
ai pc r c a  the 
active ingredient rate compiled by NASS (2002) 
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The share of each fossil fuel type on each active 
ingredient sff,f=ai,r,c is calculated as the product of 
energy requirement s“energy”,ai from Bhat et al. 
(1994) times individual shares sff,ai from Green 
(1987). 
 
Renewable Fuel Options 
 
ASMGHG integrates economic and net emission 
data on several renewable fuel technologies. 
These technologies include the production of 
switchgrass, willow, or hybrid poplar and their 
use as feedstocks for electrical power plants. In 
addition, ethanol production opportunities from 
corn and cellulose conversions of switchgrass, 
willow, and hybrid poplar are considered fol-
lowing Schneider and McCarl (2003). For each 
carbon tax scenario, we adjusted the market price 
for bioenergy crops upward by the product of 
carbon tax times carbon offset per acre of biofu-
els feedstock produced. The carbon offset factors 
were based on life cycle comparisons between 
biofuels and fossil fuels. 
 
 
Bioenergy Market Penetration 
 
Adoption of bioenergy technologies depends on 
several critical factors (Roos et al. 1999) includ-
ing business integration, scale effects, competi-
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tion effects, national and local policies, and pub-
lic opinion. The first oil crisis to result in higher 
energy prices, in 1973, did not immediately 
provide sufficient conditions for a large adoption 
of U.S. bioenergy plantations. However, it 
initiated the Brazilian sugar-based alcohol program 
(Puppim de Oliveira 2002), which increased the 
consumption of ethanol between 1976 and 1986 
more than 50 times (Moreira and Goldemberg 
1999). At the time of the second oil crisis, in 
1979, the U.S. Congress enacted the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), encour-
aging small non-utility producers to generate elec-
tricity by using co-generation techniques or re-
newable fuels. As a result of this regulation, the 
share of biomass power in the state of Maine rose 
quickly in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Roos et 
al. 1999), reaching 25 percent in 1992. This rela-
tively large implementation was triggered by a 
combination of high oil prices, tax subsidies for 
bioenergy producers from PURPA, a relatively 
positive public opinion for bioenergy, and a per-
ception that oil prices would remain high. 
 To address market penetration barriers in 
ASMGHG, we use regionally specific limits on 
biomass use in power plants. In particular, the 
maximum power generation in trillion Btu 
amounted to 91.49 for the Northern Central re-
gions, 221.54 for the Northeast, 88.22 for the 
Southern Central regions, and 176.45 for the 
Southeast. These values reflect the maximum 
industry capacity for biomass-based power in 
2020 predicted by the Energy Information Ad-
ministration (Haq 2003). 
 
Agricultural Sector Results 
 
Increased energy prices affect agriculture in mul-
tiple ways. These impacts include crop choice and 
crop management adjustments at the farm level, 
agricultural market adjustments with feedbacks to 
agricultural producers and consumers, and envi-
ronmental consequences. In representing our re-
sults, we focus on the national impacts regarding 
changes in producers’ and consumers’ surplus, 
input usage, tillage system adoption, greenhouse 
gas emission levels, and erosion. 
 A description of a few characteristics of 
ASMGHG and their ramifications on the results 
is useful for accurate interpretation of the output 
from the analysis: 
▪  ASMGHG is a static model and its solutions 
represent an intermediate-run equilibrium in 
the agricultural sector after complete crop 
and livestock adjustment to demand and sup-
ply shifts, which are induced by policies or 
new technologies. Thus, the impacts of 
higher prices for fossil fuel based energy are 
simulated as if they were fully in place. 
▪  ASMGHG allows choice of crop mix, tillage 
method, irrigation, and fertilization level, as 
well as levels of consumption, processing, 
and international trade. Higher energy costs 
incurred by U.S. producers encourage not 
only adoption of energy-sparing crop and 
livestock management in the United States 
but also reduce affected commodity demand 
and U.S. net exports. 
▪  Technological adjustments in ASMGHG are 
limited by currently available options. Thus, 
the impacts from switching to more fuel effi-
cient tractors and machinery are not taken 
into account, but tillage changes to reduce 
fuel use and crop mix changes are allowed. 
▪  ASMGH is a price-endogenous model, which 
reflects demand curves for exported and 
domestically consumed products. Changes in 
production costs are matched by changes in 
crop sale prices. Consequently, higher en-
ergy prices are likely to transfer into higher 
consumer prices. 
▪  Throughout this analysis we assume that in-
put providers can pass on all energy tax re-
lated cost increases to farmers and that they 
will not alter the input manufacturing proc-
ess, substituting either within energy sources 
or between energy and non-energy inputs. 
 
Consumer and Producer Surplus Impacts 
 
Consumer and producer surplus changes in re-
sponse to energy taxes are directly reflected by 
changes in the value of ASMGHG’s objective 
function. Consistent with economic theory, total 
surplus declines as the price of energy increases. 
A $25 per tce tax applied to fossil energy types, 
for example, costs the agricultural producers and 
consumers in the United States and in foreign 
regions about $1.3 billion annually, an amount 
equivalent to 2.8 percent of $46.4 billion, the 
observed net farm income in 2000 (NASS 2002). 
At this energy tax level, governmental revenue 
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accounts for 89 percent or about $1.15 billion, 
while the remaining 11 percent or about $150 
million constitutes deadweight losses. The sum of 
deadweight losses plus policy administration costs 
measures the minimum environmental gains for a 
policy to be preferred over the zero energy tax 
baseline. 
  Increased energy costs do not only reduce total 
agricultural surplus, they also affect the distribu-
tion of surplus between different agricultural 
market segments. Consumers of agricultural prod-
ucts incur the biggest absolute losses (Figure 1). 
Aggregate producers’ net surplus decreases for 
carbon taxes between $0 and $30 per tce relative 
to the zero tax base situation. The lowest point 
occurs at $20 per tce, where only about 50 per-
cent of a $1 billion producers’ cost change is 
passed to U.S. and international consumers (Fig-
ure 2). For energy taxes above $25, production of 
biofuels begins to become profitable and soon 
leads to positive farm income effects relative to 
the base situation. 
  ASMGHG results can be compared to those 
from other analyses. Francl, Nadler, and Bast 
(1998) estimate a 24 percent reduction in farm 
income under a $111 per ton carbon tax—a sub-
stantially different estimate than we get at similar 
tax levels. The negative producer impact is 
largely due to their exclusion of market price ad-
justments, their omission of biofuel opportunities, 
and their much higher estimates for price in-
creases in fertilizer and pesticide prices. Antle et 
al. (1999) simulated economic effects of energy 
prices on Northern Plains grain producers. For a 
$110 carbon tax they estimated variable costs to 
rise between 3 and 13 percent. Note that the au-
thors allow for acreage substitution but hold 
commodity prices constant and omit biofuels. 
Such assumptions likely make the producer im-
pacts more negative. 
  Our results are also somewhat different from 
estimates of Peters et al. (2001), who predict that 
U.S. agricultural producers would lose $253 mil-
lion at a tax of $14 per tce, $1.8 billion at a tax of 
$100 per tce, and $3.6 billion at a tax of $200 per 
tce. ASMGHG estimates are relatively close for 
the low tax level scenario, with an estimated pro-
ducer surplus loss of $298 million at a compara-
ble tax rate of $15 per metric tce. At higher en-
ergy tax levels, ASMGHG computes positive 
producer impacts amounting to $601 million at a 
tax of $100 per tce, and $2.1 billion at a tax of 
$200 per tce. The agricultural sector analysis by 
Konyar and Howitt (2000) estimates a 2.3 percent 
increase in farmers’ net benefit at a carbon equiva-
lent price of $348 per ton. Based on ASMGHG’s 
$350 per tce scenario results, we calculate an 11 
percent income increase due to both biofuel 
production (a factor not present in Konyar and 
Howitt 2000) and related price increases for tradi-
tional commodities. 
  Economic surplus changes are related to market 
adjustments. As shown in Figure 3, energy taxes 
decrease crop and livestock production levels and 
increase commodity prices. Because we did not 
impose energy taxes on foreign countries, U.S. 
agricultural exports also decline. Rising com-
modity prices explain in part why our farm in-
come changes are less negative than those from 
studies with constant prices. At higher carbon 
prices, enhanced biofuel production creates a 
double effect of generating a new source revenue 
and at the same time pushing up traditional com-
modity prices. 
 
Biomass Power Capacity 
and Farm Income Impacts 
 
The results presented in this analysis portray 
relatively tight market penetration limits for bio-
mass power. To address the uncertainty of these 
restrictions, we conducted a sensitivity analysis, 
where on one end we allowed no biomass power 
at all and on the other end we assumed no re-
gional capacity limits on biomass processing 
power plants. In between these two extremes, we 
also imposed regional capacity maximums as 
predicted by the U.S. Energy Information Ad-
ministration (Haq 2003) for various time hori-
zons. Figure 4 shows selected results of this exer-
cise. For low carbon tax levels, the magnitude of 
market penetration limits is irrelevant because 
energy crops are inferior to other land use op-
tions. However, as carbon taxes increase, energy 
crops become attractive and the impact of bio-
mass penetration limits becomes more and more 
distinct. At a $100 per tce tax, net producer sur-
plus changes range between $1.7 billion losses 
(no energy crops) and $24.6 billion gains (no 
capacity limit on biomass power). 




















































Figure 1. Economic Surplus Impacts of U.S. Carbon-Based Energy Taxes on the Agricultural 
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Figure 2. Impacts of Carbon-Based Energy Taxes on U.S. Agricultural Producers 
Notes: Direct cost impacts include increased input expenditure minus increased bioenergy revenues related to carbon tax and 
emission levels. Indirect gains include economic net benefits resulting from adjustments in resource usage, commodity supply, 
and market prices. 













































Figure 3. Agricultural Market Adjustments in Response to U.S. Carbon Taxes on Energy 























































Figure 4. Sensitivity of U.S. Agricultural Producer Surplus Impacts to Different Energy Tax 
Levels and Different Bioenergy Market Penetration Limits 
Note: The “2020 limit” line corresponds to the “Producers’ surplus” line in Figure 1 and the “Net effect” line in Figure 2. 
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Impacts on Crop Management 
and Environmental Indicators 
 
How does the imposition of energy taxes affect 
the optimal crop and land use choice and man-
agement intensity? As shown in Tables 4 and 5, 
the distribution of agricultural land between tra-
ditional crops, pasture, and energy crop planta-
tions remains fairly unchanged for tax levels be-
low $25 per tce. However, higher tax levels lead 
to increases in bioenergy feedstock plantations at 
the expense of traditional cropland and pasture. 
Without market penetration limits for biomass 
power (Table 5), these increases are substantial, 
amounting to cropland shares of 7, 25, and 43 
percent at tax levels of $50, $100, and $350 per 
tce, respectively. 
  The decline in traditional cropland leads to 
crop mix alterations and to adjustments with re-
spect to irrigation, tillage, and fertilizer intensity. 
At lower tax rates, we observe a slight decrease in 
irrigation and fertilization. Tillage systems remain 
fairly unchanged. At higher tax levels, the re-
sponse depends on the magnitude of biomass 
power generation. With relatively little acreage 
devoted to energy crop plantations (Table 4), tra-
ditional crops are managed less intensively as 
energy becomes more expensive. However, dif-
ferent responses are observed when energy crop 
plantations occupy a relatively large area (Table 
5). Irrigation and nitrogen fertilization on tradi-
tional cropland increase for tax levels above $50 
per tce. Conventional tillage increases for me-
dium tax levels but decreases slightly if taxes are 
above $100 per tce. 
  Aggregate greenhouse gas emission impacts 
are also listed in Table 4 and Table 5. Carbon 
source reductions include emission reductions from 
machinery use, irrigation, grain drying, and fertil-
izer and pesticide manufacturing. Biofuel offsets 
are net emission savings resulting from replace-
ments of fossil fuel energy. Savings in these two 
greenhouse gas accounts are directly promoted by 
energy tax policies. Soil carbon sequestration and 
methane and nitrous oxide emissions, on the other 
hand, are not directly affected. Changes in these 
unregulated accounts represent positive or nega-
tive externalities to energy tax policies. 
  Comparing values between Table 4 and Table 
5, we find relatively similar emission decreases 
for carbon sources. However, this match is spuri-
ous because different mechanisms cause this rela-
tively similar result. Particularly, if little area is 
devoted to energy crops, carbon source reductions 
arise mainly from a decrease in traditional crop 
management intensity. If, on the other hand, a large 
area is devoted to energy crops, carbon source 
reductions result mainly from an area reduction of 
intensively managed crops. The assumption about 
possible market penetration of biomass has a 
strong impact on the amount of bioenergy gener-
ated. For an energy tax of $100 per ton of carbon, 
biomass power is ceilinged at a level 0.6 Btu 
Quads (Table 4) but yields 5.5 Btu Quads when 
the market restrictions are imposed (Table 5). 
  The response of the unregulated GHG accounts 
shows that soil carbon sequestration on traditional 
cropland is generally higher with bioenergy limits 
than without. In both cases, soil carbon values 
decrease for medium-level energy taxes but in-
crease again for very high tax levels. The behav-
ior corresponds relatively well to the simulated 
change in tillage intensity. Nitrous oxide and 
methane emissions from livestock decrease as 
energy becomes more expensive and do so even 
more if a lot of bioenergy can be generated. Again, 
large energy crop plantations decrease acreage of 
traditional crops, which in turn leads to higher 
prices for livestock feeds. As a result, the number 
of livestock decreases, and so do associated emis-
sions. 
  Non greenhouse gas related environmental im-
pacts include soil erosion and nutrient emissions 
and are listed in the last section of Table 4 and 
Table 5. Erosion on traditional cropland increases 
slightly at low energy tax levels but decreases at 
higher energy tax levels. Note that at low tax 
levels, there is no substantial shift in overall 
tillage. However, erosion is not just a function of 
overall tillage but involves complex interactions 
of crop, management, topography, and weather. 
Estimates of nitrogen and phosphorus emission 
impacts on traditional croplands are mostly nega-
tive, implying additional environmental gains. 
  In interpreting our results on erosion and nutri-
ent emission impacts, two qualifications must be 
made. First, while traditional crop yields are dif-
ferent for different land qualities, we do not have 
such differentiating information for energy crops. 
Because erosion and nutrient emission coeffi-
cients are strongly correlated with land qualities,  
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Table 4. Average Land Use and Environmental Impacts of Higher Energy Prices 
with 2020 Market Penetration Limits for Biomass Power 
   Carbon tax level on fossil-fuel–based energy in $/tce 
Impact  indicator  Unit  0  10 25 50 75  100  200  350  500 
Agricultural land use        
Traditional crops  10
6 acres  323.2 322.8 321.0 315.5 313.2 312.9 305.7  303.0  297.3
 Corn  acreage  %  100.0 99.7 99.3 98.2 95.7 94.5 90.7  85.1  83.0
 Soybean  acreage  %  100.0 100.3 100.4 98.7 99.4 99.5 97.6  99.0  97.0
 Wheat  acreage  %  100.0 100.0 99.0 97.4 97.8 97.9 96.5  95.8  92.8
 Sorghum  acreage  %  100.0 98.8 98.1 93.5 89.9 91.5 86.7  90.4  90.0
 Rice  acreage  %  100.0 94.7 79.2 68.9 64.5 64.1 49.1  45.7  44.2
 Barley  acreage  %  100.0 99.9 100.0 100.2 99.4 99.1 104.4  105.9  106.4
 Silage  acreage  %  100.0 99.2 98.9 95.9 95.3 95.4 93.0  95.5  90.4
 Hay  acreage  %  100.0 100.2 100.6 99.1 98.5 99.7 98.2  98.4  96.8
Pasture 10
6 acres  397.8 398.3 398.2 397.4 399.7 400.0 407.1  409.9  415.5
Energy crops  10
6 acres  0.0 0.0 1.8 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.2  8.2  8.2
 Switchgrass  10
6 acres  0.0 0.0 1.8 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.2  8.1  8.1
 Hybrid  poplar  10
6 acres  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0
 Willow  10
6 acres  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0  0.1  0.1
Traditional crop land management        
Conventional tillage  %  67.1 66.6 67.6 66.8 69.9 66.4 54.6 43.2  38.3
Reduced tillage  %  28.5 29.1 28.1 27.9 24.6 23.8 9.7 6.3  5.5
Zero tillage  %  4.4 4.3 4.4 5.3 5.5 9.7 35.7  50.6  56.2
Irrigation %  17.2 16.6 15.6 14.5 13.4 12.3 9.1  6.4  5.1
Intensive nitrogen  %  73.6 62.3 61.6 62.4 62.1 61.8 61.3  60.3  58.4
Nitrogen fertilizer  kg/acre 26.3 24.2 23.8 23.4 23.0 22.9 22.0 20.9  20.0
Phosphorus fertilizer  kg/acre  4.4 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.5  3.3
Greenhouse gas emission abatement impacts        
CO2 source reductions  mmtce    2.0 4.3 6.5 8.3 9.5 14.7  18.7  21.3
Biofuel offsets  mmtce    0.0 4.0 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3  17.3  17.3
Bio-energy 10
15 Btu    0.0 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6  0.6  0.6
Soil sequestration  mmtce    0.5 -0.3 1.1 0.0 4.3 24.6  37.5  46.9
Livestock N2O + CH4 mmtce   -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.8 0.7 -1.2 -1.8  -2.9
Crop N2O + CH4 mmtce   1.0 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.1 3.1  3.8  4.4
Total GHG reduction  mmtce    3.4 9.2 27.0 28.5 34.0 58.6 75.6  87.1
GHG externality  %    67.3 10.3 12.9 11.2 26.6 82.7 109.5  125.3
Other environmental impacts from traditional crop land       
Erosion  ∆%/acre   2.7 3.9 2.2 2.1 1.1 -11.9  -17.0  -18.9
N percolation  ∆%/acre   -4.9 -7.5 -10.9 -12.2 -12.6 -18.9  -18.8  -20.5
N subsurface flow  ∆%/acre   -11.0 -13.0 -14.3 -15.0 -16.2 -17.6  -19.5  -20.2
N surface runoff loss  ∆%/acre   -0.6 -3.1 -2.2 -2.3 -2.4 -1.0  2.6  3.1
P loss with sediment  ∆%/acre   -0.3 0.6 -1.8 -2.2 -3.0 -8.4  -16.4  -20.7
 
 
our results may over- or understate erosion esti-
mates in cases where the assumption of equal 
energy crop yields on different land qualities is 
violated. Second, we lack erosion and nutrient 
emission coefficients for energy crops and thus 
analyze related impacts only on traditional crop-
land. This may understate the true environmental 
co-effects because the dense permanent cover of  
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Table 5. Average Land Use and Environmental Impacts of Higher Energy Prices with 
No Market Penetration Limits for Biomass Power  
   Carbon tax level on fossil-fuel–based energy in $/tce 
Impact indicator  Unit  0  10  25  50  75  100  200  350  500 
Agricultural  land  use          
Traditional crops  10
6  Acres  323.2 322.8 321.0 306.0 276.2 261.5 220.8 205.4 199.3
  Corn  acreage  %  100.0 99.7 99.3 94.2 84.9 78.2 58.9 52.2 48.6
  Soybean  acreage  %  100.0 100.3 100.4 94.6 79.7 71.7 48.9 41.7 39.7
  Wheat  acreage  %  100.0 100.0 99.0 95.5 89.5 87.9 78.5 73.0 71.5
  Sorghum  acreage  %  100.0 98.8 98.1 88.3 81.5 84.8 82.3 77.4 79.5
  Rice  acreage  %  100.0 94.7 79.2 64.4 43.0 41.6 39.2 38.2 37.1
  Barley  acreage  %  100.0 99.9 100.0 101.3 98.5 96.5 95.9 93.9 92.4
  Silage  acreage  %  100.0 99.2 98.9 91.8 83.2 77.4 60.4 49.3 45.9
  Hay  acreage  %  100.0 100.2 100.6 97.2 91.1 88.8 84.3 80.2 77.7
Pasture 10
6  Acres  397.8 398.3 398.2 392.7 382.9 379.6 377.8 377.5 377.5
Energy crops  10
6  Acres  0.0 0.0 1.8 22.3 62.0 79.9 122.4 138.2 144.2
 switchgrass  10
6  Acres  0.0 0.0 1.8 19.9 57.2 73.9 72.5 87.0 73.6
 hybrid  poplar  10
6  Acres  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.4 38.6 57.9
 willow  10
6  Acres  0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 4.8 6.1 12.5 12.6 12.6
Traditional crop land management           
Conventional tillage  %  67.1 66.6 67.6 70.2 78.2 78.4 75.5 71.4 71.2
Reduced tillage  %  28.5 29.1 28.1 25.6 17.2 14.5 4.5 3.2 2.7
Zero  tillage  %  4.4 4.3 4.4 4.2 4.5 7.1 20.1 25.4 26.1
Irrigation  %  17.2 16.6 15.6 14.8 19.3 20.7 26.7 28.6 29.7
Intensive  nitrogen  %  73.6 62.3 61.6 63.8 69.0 72.4 77.5 79.4 80.1
Nitrogen fertilizer  kg/acre 26.3 24.2 23.8 23.5 24.2 24.5 26.5 25.7 25.4
Phosphorus fertilizer  kg/acre  4.4 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.0
Greenhouse gas emission abatement impacts            
CO2 source reductions  mmtce  2.2 4.5 7.9 10.5 12.1 16.7  19.5  20.7
Biofuel  offsets  mmtce  0.0 4.0 48.7 129.3 164.7 250.8 275.7 287.6
Bio-energy 10
15  Btu  0.0 0.1 1.6 4.3 5.5 8.4 9.2 9.6
Soil  sequestration  mmtce  0.6 -0.3 -2.3 -9.7 -8.4 2.6 7.2 7.7
Livestock N2O + CH4 mmtce  0.0 -0.1 2.8 5.4 6.1 7.0 7.9 8.7
Crop N2O + CH4 mmtce  1.1 1.5 2.3 3.2 3.6 4.6 5.6 5.9
Total GHG reduction  mmtce  4.0 9.6 59.4 138.7 178.1 278.5 312.6 327.4
GHG  externality  %  76.8 12.7 5.0 -0.8 0.8 5.3 7.0 7.2
Other environmental impacts from traditional crop land           
Erosion  ∆%/acre  2.8 4.1 5.7 1.0 -4.0 -12.8 -25.4 -26.0
N percolation  ∆%/acre  -4.9 -7.5 -15.0 -12.9 -14.3 -8.9 -4.1 -3.6
N subsurface flow  ∆%/acre  -11.1 -13.1 -13.1 -9.9 -11.3 -12.3 -10.2  -9.5
N surface runoff loss  ∆%/acre  -0.6 -3.1 -5.0 -12.5 -14.5 -14.1 -17.7 -17.9
P loss with sediment  ∆%/acre  -0.3 0.6 3.9 -0.5 -2.5 -10.9 -22.2 -24.1
 
 
switchgrass and the low soil disturbance of all 
three portrayed perennial energy crops suggest 
further erosion reductions on lands diverted to 
these perennial crops. 
Concluding Comments 
 
Agriculture may find itself operating under higher 
energy prices due to domestic or international 
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greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts. Farm 
interest groups fear that farm income will be 
negatively affected. Previous studies using 
restrictive assumptions about market and farm 
management adjustments have partially confirmed 
this concern. Our results do not support such a 
conclusion. 
  Our model suggests only small losses to agri-
cultural producers when carbon taxes are modest, 
but show benefits to farmers when carbon taxes 
induce substantial energy price increases, with 
consumers bearing the main burden of these 
taxes. Two factors drive these conclusions. First, 
as agricultural production becomes more costly, 
supply cutbacks cause agricultural commodity 
prices to rise. Thus, higher revenues will offset a 
large portion of the farm cost increases. Second, 
when production of biofuel feedstocks becomes a 
profitable business opportunity, additional reve-
nues are created in the farm sector. Moreover, the 
diversion of resources to bioenergy feedstocks 
lowers traditional production, which further in-
creases traditional crop prices. 
  The results of our analysis provide insights into 
how farmers might adjust their management 
practices in response to higher energy prices if for 
example the high prices first seen in the fall of 
2004 persist. The net response is driven by two 
opposite incentive developments. On the one 
hand, higher energy prices yield a competitive 
advantage for energy-friendly crop management 
practices including reduced tillage, reduced 
irrigation, and reduced nitrogen fertilization. On 
the other hand, as energy prices increase, agri-
cultural commodity prices increase as well. 
Higher commodity prices promote yield-intensive 
crop management strategies, which commonly 
implies energy-intensive management. Depending 
on the net effect of these two incentives, farmers 
will pursue either energy-intensive or energy-
friendly management. Our model suggests that 
the adoption of energy-friendly management pre-
vails as long as biofuel production is not profit-
able. As the biofuel acreage increases, manage-
ment for traditional crops gradually shifts back to 
yield and energy-intensive management. 
  Modifications in agricultural management have 
implications for many environmental qualities in-
cluding greenhouse gas emissions, soil erosion, 
and nutrient emissions. Our results show that en-
ergy taxes do not automatically lead to environ-
mental co-benefits in U.S. agriculture. For mod-
erate carbon tax levels, i.e., levels below $100 per 
tce, our analysis suggests environmental gains in 
some unregulated greenhouse gas and nutrient 
emission accounts, but slight losses with respect 
to soil erosion and soil carbon. If a large area is 
diverted to biomass feedstock production, incen-
tives for more intensive management can worsen 
environmental impacts from traditional crops. 
Environmental co-effects should therefore be 
carefully considered when judging the desirability 
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